Arthur Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940).British prime minister, the son of Joseph Chamberlain and the brother of Austen Chamberlain, was born in 1869. He was ban and educated in Birmingham and after a successfull bussiness carter), studied commerce, metalurgy and engineering desing at Masan College (later university of Birmingham). In 1911 he as elected to the Birmingham city Consul and later served as Lord Mayor of Birmingham in 1915 and 1916 and was elected to the Canmicus in 1917 he was director of national service, superusing causoriptian and the following year, at the age of 50, he was elected to Parliament as a Conservative for Laywood. He refused office under David Lloyd George but accepted the posts Postmaster-General (1923-1924) and Minister of Health (1923-1924-1929 and 1931) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1923-1924 and 1931-1937) before he successed Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister.

In that office his mayor aim was to avoid a european war at all costs. His policity of appeasement toward Adolf Hitler´s Germany culminated in the Munich Pact of september 1938, after wich Chamberlain returned have proclaiming``peace for our time´´.

"We, the German Führer and Chancellor, and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for our two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference, and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe."Chamberlain read the above statement in front of 10 Downing St. and said:

"My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time... Go home and get a nice quiet sleep."

Chamberlain confronted the threat to peace posed by Germany and Italy. Seeking to appease Adolf HITLER and Benito MUSSOLINI, he firstnegotiated a treaty with Italy accepting the conquest of Ethiopia on condition that Italy withdraw from the Spanish Civil War. Turning to the Czech question Chamberlain conferred with Hitler and Mussolini. In the Munich pact (1938), signed also by France, Chamberlain accepted Hitler's territorial claims to predominantly German areas of Czechoslovakia.Though Chamberlain assured Britain that his concession had brought "peace in our time, Hitler soon broke his agreement and occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia.After Germany invaded Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, Chamberlain honored a pledge to stand by Poland and led Britain into war two days later. Although his policies were discredited, he held on as prime minister until May 1940, when he resigned and was succeeded by Winston CHURCHILL. He died in Heckfield on Nov. 9, 1940.Character and Political PhilosophyAs befitted the son of the most famous Liberal Radical of the late 19th century, Neville Chamberlain was keenly interested in the amelioration of social conditions. But unlike his father, he brought little passion or demagogy to his work. His political character was thus very different from that his opponents in the Labour party, for whom the demonstration of public passion on behalf of the working classes was a political creed. To Labourites, Chamberlain's concern with administrative minutiae, financial probity, and individual responsibility (which he feared the careless extension of state welfare might undermine) appeared as inhuman indifference to the poor. Chamberlain was by temperament a businessman and a civil servant before he was a politician; although he did much to extend welfare services between the wars, his contribution was that of rationalization and was not based on a desire to change quickly and radically the existing qualities of social life.If to his domestic politics he brought little of the fervor of his Birmingham Radical upbringing, this quality was surprisingly present when he turned to foreign affairs. His "appeasement has seldom been discussed in this light, and most of his critics have misrepresented his position. The urgent desire to negotiate with Hitler and Mussolini did not, in Chamberlain's case, spring from pacifism. He strongly supported sanctions against Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and was a vocal supporter of rearmament after 1934. Nor was he ignorant of the menace of the dictators. Few people linked the need for rearmament more strongly with the ambitions of Germany. But the crucial characteristic of Chamberlain's support of rearmament lay in his vision of such rearmament as a support for negotiations that would institute a general peace. Chamberlain believed that a lasting peace would be possible when British rearmament had helped demonstrate to the dictators that the alternatives to negotiation were unthinkable.Chamberlain's willingness to negotiate with Hitler was thus more than a result of a sense of military weakness and a refusal to regard the German minority in Czechoslovakia as worth fighting over--although these considerations were present. It sprang also from a passionate desire to avert the horror of war and a firm belief in the possibility of a lasting general peace. This policy of "negotiation through strength was always potentially self-defeating. The more Britain rearmed, the less sincere her desire for peace might appear; the more she spoke of peace, the less credible the deterrence of rearmament might become. When the British declared war on Germany, Chamberlain's policy had failed. The deterrent was to be used, and he above all men was stricken by the catastrophe that he had striven to prevent. This repugnance to war made him appear to many to be unfitted for wartime politics; he resigned after the obvious discontent within his own party was combined with the refusal of the Labour party to join any government led by him.On reflection, Chamberlain's apparent coldness is not easily distinguished from a strong sense of integrity and public service. If his self-confidence and rigidity of will were placed in policies now generally believed mistaken, they were policies supported by most of his contemporaries and ones that Chamberlain defended more intelligently than most he ignorant of the menace of the dictators. Few people linked the need for rearmament more strongly with the ambitions of Germany. But the crucial characteristic of Chamberlain's support of rearmament lay in his vision of such rearmament as a support for negotiations that would institute a general peace. Chamberlain believed that a lasting peace would be possible when British rearmament had helped demonstrate to the dictators that the alternatives to negotiation were unthinkable. Chamberlain's willingness to negotiate with Hitler wasthus more than a result of a sense of military weakness and a refusal to regard the German minority in Czechoslovakia as worth fighting over--although these considerations were present. It sprang also from a passionate desire to avert the horror of war and a firm belief in the possibility of a lasting general peace. This policy of "negotiation through strength was always potentially self-defeating. The more Britain rearmed, the less sincere her desire for peace might appear; themore she spoke of peace, the less credible the deterrence of rearmament might become. When the British declared war on Germany, Chamberlain's policy had failed. The deterrent was to be used, and he above all men was stricken by the catastrophe that he had striven to prevent. This repugnance to war made him appear to many to be unfitted for wartime politics; he resigned after the obvious discontent within his own party was combined with the refusal of the Labour party to join any government led by him.

On reflection, Chamberlain's apparent coldness is not easily distinguished from a strong sense of integrity and public service. If his self-confidence and rigidity of will were placed in policies now generally believed mistaken, they were policies supported by most of his contemporaries and ones that Chamberlain defended more intelligently than most.